The existence of a dictator for the aggregation of strict preferences over a given set A of m alternatives is shown when simpler versions of the following downward and upward procedures are simultaneously used and forced to deliver a social welfare function. Choice functions d 1 , … , d m , u 1 , … , u m mapping profiles of alternatives into alternatives are arbitrarily selected. For preference profile P, the top x 1 in the collective preference p associated with P is the value that d 1 associates with the profile of the top-ranked alternatives in P. The second most preferred alternative x 2 in p is the value that d 2 associates with the profile of the top-ranked alternatives in P restricted to A\{x 1 }. The third alternative in p is the value that d 3 associates with the profile of the top-ranked alternatives in P restricted to A\{x 1 , x 2 }. And so on until the m positions are filled. The upward procedure resorts to u 1 , … , u m in a similar way but starting from the bottom-ranked alternatives.
Introduction
If there is one, the representative economic model has a set of states of the world, agents making decisions at every state and rules establishing how the decisions are made and how such decisions determine the passage from one state to another. The analysis of this type of model unfolds in two directions: one trying to characterize the states that can be reached under the given rules; the other, dealing with the evaluation of the collective desirability of such states. This evaluation relies on the selection of criteria determining whether a state is, from a collective point of view, more desirable than another one.
Arrow's [1, p. 97 ] theorem pointed to the possibility that making progress in the second direction could not be an easy task. This theorem is formulated in a framework in which the aim is to define an aggregation rule that obtains a collective preference over states exclusively from the agents' preferences over states. Such aggregation rules could next be used to evaluate states from a collective point of view and, in this way, complete the analysis of the representative economic model along the second direction.
In the version of Arrow's theorem for preferences in which indifference is not present and all preferences are allowed, two criteria derived from the majority principle are imposed on preference aggregation rules. One is the Pareto principle: if all the agents prefer state x to state y then x should be preferred to y in the preference associated with the collective of agents. The second is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition: the collective preference between two states only depends on the agents' preferences over those states. The result is that all the aggregation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and IIA are dictatorial: for some agent i, the collective preference always coincides with i's preference. As a consequence, imposing IIA and the Pareto principle on aggregation rules amounts to letting one agent always determine whether one state is more desirable than another state from a collective point of view.
Arrow's theorem has been shown to be a relatively robust result; see, for instance, [3] .
Despite this, recent contributions seem to indicate that the difficulties associated with Arrow's theorem can be overcome or are, at least, in need of reassessment. For example, Campbell and Kelly [2, 4] suggest small departures from IIA that allow the existence of aggregation rules that are far from dictatorial; Saari [6, 7] questions the appropriateness of IIA as a reasonable requirement for the type of aggregation rules considered in Arrow's theorem; and Tangian [8, 9] suggests an interpretation of dictators as representatives that even justifies sustaining a positive assessment of Arrow's theorem.
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Arrow's theorem follows a vertical approach to preference aggregation in the sense that IIA and the Pareto principle are conditions stating whether a state is or not above another state in the collective preference ranking. Houy [5] considers an alternative horizontal approach according to which the state that occupies any given position r in the collective preference only depends on the states that occupy position r in the agents' preferences. Specifically, a choice function c r is associated with each position r in the collective preference, so that the state in position r is the value that c r attributes to the profile of states occupying position r in the agents' preferences. Houy [5, p. 343] shows that aggregation rules obtained using choice functions to determine each position in the collective preference always output the same preference or has an individual who determines the collective preference for some renaming of states.
Both approaches reduce preference aggregation to simpler aggregation problems. In Arrow's case, preference aggregation over m alternatives is reduced to preference aggregation over just two alternatives. In Houy's case, preference aggregation over m alternatives is reduced to m problems of choosing over alternatives. This paper considers the aggregation of strict preferences following a rather mixed approach.
As in Houy's approach, the collectively most preferred state is assumed to depend only on the profile of most preferred states. So a choice function determines the top state in the collective preference. That choice made, the selected stated is removed from the agents' preferences and the same strategy is followed: another choice function determines the top state in the new problem (which is the second state in the general aggregation problem). Therefore, the second most preferred state in the collective preference does not depend on the profile of second most preferred states in the agents' preferences but on the profile of most preferred states when the collectively most preferred state is removed. And so on until all the positions in the collective preference are filled. It is worth noticing that this procedure generates more aggregation rules than IIA (when slightly complemented as in [10] ) or Houy's procedure; see Example 4.5.
Two variations on this procedure are considered. First, since there is no reason why aggregation should proceed from top to bottom, a symmetry requirement seems reasonable: the procedure applied from top to bottom should yield the same result as when applied (with possibly different choice functions) from bottom to top. In fact, much less will be assumed, namely, that each procedure applies up to a certain position. For instance, with m positions, the up-down procedure may be asked to provide the states filling positions 1 to r and the down-up procedure to fill positions m to r + 1.
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And second, both procedures are relaxed in the spirit of IIA. By way of illustration, if the up-down procedure is supposed to operate from positions 1 to r, the weakening consists of requiring that, for each position s from 1 to r, if two preference profiles agree from position 1 to s then the same states that appear in the first s positions in the collective preference associated with one profile must appear (not necessarily in the same order) in the collective preference associated with the other profile. An analogous weakening is applied to the down-up procedure.
Definitions are brought together in Section 2, assumptions in Section 3, results in Section 4 and the proofs of the results in Section 5. The main result, Proposition 4.1, states that, for at least two agents and three states, the only aggregation rules satisfying a mild unanimity condition and whose output can be obtained by a combination of updown and down-up procedures are the dictatorial ones. A second result, Proposition 4.7, relaxes the unanimity condition by replacing it with an ontoness property: every state has a preference profile for which it is top-ranked in the collective preference. These two results, combined with Houy's theorem and the family of Arrovian impossibilities, contribute to reinforce the link between independence type assumptions for preference aggregation and the existence of dictators.
Definitions
Let N = {1, … , n} be a finite non-empty set of natural numbers whose n members represent individuals (or voters or agents) and let A be a finite non-empty set whose m elements represent alternatives (or candidates or states). Preferences on A are strict: no member of A is indifferent to any other member of A. The interpretation is then that, in preference (x 1 , … , x m ), x s is preferred to x t if, and only if, s
For preference p ∈ L, r ∈ {1, … , m} and B ⊆ A: (i) r p designates the rth element in the sequence p, so r p is the rth most preferred member of A according to p; and (ii) p B denotes the restriction of p to B, so x is preferred to y in p B if, and only if, x is preferred to y in p.
is the preference obtained from p by reversing p. For p ∈ L, r ∈ {1, … , m} and B ⊆ A, r p* designates the rth element in the inverse preference p*, whereas 1 p* B designates the first element in the inverse preference p* when p* is restricted to the subset B of A. For P ∈ L n and i ∈ N, P i designates the preference corresponding to individual i in preference profile P.
A social welfare function maps preference profiles (representing the individuals' preferences on A) into preferences (representing a collective preference on A).
Definition 2.4.
A social welfare function f is dictatorial if there is i ∈ N such that, for all
Assumptions
UNA is the weak unanimity requirement stating that, for each preference profile in which all agents agree in which are the best and worst alternatives, the social welfare function must respect at least of these two agreements.
DOWN r expresses the postulate that the social welfare function is downward generated, from position 1 to r ≤ m, by r choice mappings d 1 , … , d r as follows: (i) d 1 determines the most preferred alternative in the collective preference using the individuals' most preferred alternatives as inputs; and (ii) for r ≥ 2, d r determines the rth most preferred alternative using as inputs the individuals' most preferred alternatives when the alternatives occupying the r − 1 first positions in the collective preference are removed.
UP r . For every t ∈ {1, … , r}, there is a mapping u t :
UP r is the symmetric version of DOWN r : whereas the latter starts from position 1 and generates the collective preference downwards, the former starts from the last position m and generates the collective preference upwards.
IND
↓ r is an independence type condition version of DOWN r . By IND ↓ r , the following holds for every position t ∈ {1, … , r}. Consider two preference profiles such that, for every individual i, i's preference from position 1 to position t is the same in both profiles. Then, in the two collective preferences corresponding to the two profiles, the set of alternatives that occupy the first t positions is the same.
n and Q ∈ L n , if, for all t ∈ {1, … , r} and i ∈ N, t P i * = t Q i * then ONTO r attributes each alternative the right of being top-ranked in the collective preference associated with some profile. It can be viewed as a principle of nondiscrimination for alternatives. f(P) = 3 P 1 and 2 f(P) = 2 P 2  A P , where A P = A\{ 3 P 1 }. Since 1 is a dictator for position m = 3, UNA holds. UP 3 holds with mappings u 1 , u 2 and u 3 such that, for all ξ ∈ A 2 , u 1 (ξ) = ξ 1 and u 2 (ξ) = u 3 (ξ) = ξ 2 . To see that DOWN 1 does not hold, let P ∈ L n and Q ∈ L n satisfy:
Results
which is not the case:
UNA can be removed from Proposition 4.1 if it is assumed instead that, for instance, the
replaces UNA with a weaker condition ONTO 1 without having to impose any additional property on the mappings associated with the UP and DOWN conditions. (i) for all ξ ∈ A n , u 1 (ξ) ∈ {ξ 1 , … , ξ n } and d 1 (ξ) ∈ {ξ 1 , … , ξ n }; and
Proof.
Step 1: for all x ∈ A, u 1 (x N ) = x. Let x ∈ A and suppose u 1 (x N ) = y ∈ A\{x}.
Choose P ∈ L n with 1 P = (y N ) and
Step 3: for all ξ ∈ A n , u 1 (ξ) ∈ {ξ 1 , … , ξ n }. Suppose not: for some x ∈ A and ξ ∈ A n ,
Step 4: for all ξ ∈ A n , d 1 (ξ) ∈ {ξ 1 , … , ξ n }. Suppose not: for some x ∈ A and ξ ∈ A n ,
Step 5: there are i ∈ N, x ∈ A and y ∈ A\{x} such that d 1 (x i , y −i ) = x. Suppose not:
Choose r ∈ {2, … , n − 1} and, arguing inductively, assume that, for all x ∈ A, y ∈ ) and
), where z ∈ A\{x, y}.
). By the induction hypothesis,
x. By DOWN 1 and step 4,
where J has r + 1 members.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. "⇐" Let f be dictatorial, so there is i ∈ N such that, for all P ∈ L n , f(P) = P i . It is then plain that, for all r ∈ {1, … , m}, UNA, IND 
To show that 1 f(P) = v, suppose otherwise: for some z ∈ A\{v}, 1 f(P) = z. Define I = {k ∈ N:
and J = {k ∈ N: 1 P k = v}. Case 1a: I = ∅. By DOWN 1 and Lemma 5.
contradiction. Case 1b: I ≠ ∅.
Case 2:
Choose w ∈ A\{x, z} and define K = {k ∈ N:
contradiction.
•
Step 3: for all P ∈ L n and t ∈ {1, … , r}, t f(P) = t P i .
Step 1 proves the case r = 1. For r ≥ 2, select t ∈ {2, … , r} and, arguing inductively, suppose that, for all P ∈ L n and s ∈ {1, … , t − 1},
With t f(P) = y, the induction hypothesis implies y ∉ { 1 P i , … , t−1 P i }. Hence, as m − r ≥ 2, there is u > t such that u P i = y. Let Q ∈ L n be obtained from P by moving y in P i from position u to position m, if necessary. Thus, for all k ∈ N and v ∈ {1, … , t},
Step 4: for all P ∈ L n and t ∈ {m, m − 1, … , r + 1}, t f(P) = t P i . By step 3, it actually suffices to show that, for all P ∈ L n and t ∈ {m, m − 1, … , r + 2}, t f(P) = t P i . If m − r − 1 = 1 then r = m − 2 and step 2 proves the result. If m − r − 1 ≥ 2 then select t ∈ {m − 1, … , r + 2} and, arguing inductively, suppose that, for all P ∈ L n and s ∈ {m, … , t + 1},
the induction hypothesis implies y ∉ { t+1 P i , … , m P i }. Hence, as t ≤ r + 2, there is u < t such that u P i = y. Let Q ∈ L n be obtained from P by moving y in P i from position u to Step 2: for all P ∈ L n , 1 f(P) ∈ { 1 P 1 , … , 1 P n }. Suppose not: x ∈ A and P ∈ L n satisfy 1 f(P) = x ∉ { 1 P 1 , … , 1 P n }. Choose Q ∈ L n such that 
